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Televising the Supreme Court: Why Legislation Fails 
R. PATRICK THORNBERRY

 
INTRODUCTION 
Senator Arlen Specter spent much of his last few years in the Senate trying to 
pass legislation aimed at forcing the U.S. Supreme Court to allow television 
cameras to record oral arguments.
1
 While he will no longer be the one to champion 
the proposal into law,
2
 getting cameras in the Supreme Court is not a new issue,
3
 
and future congressmen will presumably pick up the debate where Specter left it.
4
 
Specter’s bills, identical in form and proposed in every Congress since 2005,5 are 
concise and well suited for analyzing the topic of a congressional mandate on the 
Court to allow cameras to record the Court’s proceedings. Specter’s final bill, 
Senate Bill 446, will be the focus of this Note and reads, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
The Supreme Court shall permit television coverage of all open 
sessions of the Court unless the Court decides, by a vote of the majority 
of justices, that allowing such coverage in a particular case would 
constitute a violation of the due process rights of 1 or more of the 
parties before the Court.
6
 
                                                                                                                 
 
  J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to Professor Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer and Professor Deborah Widiss for their guidance throughout the writing of 
this Note. All mistakes are my own. 
 1. See Michael C. Dorf, Arlen Specter’s Swan Song: Mandating Cameras in the 
Supreme Court, FINDLAW (Sept. 20, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/ 
20100920.html.  
 2. Specter’s career as a senator ended with the close of the 111th Congress in 
December 2010. See Carl Hulse, Arlen Specter’s Closing Argument, THE CAUCUS: THE 
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010, 1:15 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/arlen-specters-closing-argument/?ref=arlen 
specter. 
 3. LORRAINE H. TONG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33706, TELEVISING SUPREME 
COURT AND OTHER FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS: LEGISLATION AND ISSUES 1 (2006), 
available at http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada458314.pdf (“Over the years, some in Congress, 
the public, and the media have expressed interest in televising Supreme Court and other 
federal court proceedings.”). 
 4. There are several members of Congress, in addition to Specter, who have already 
expressed an interest in getting cameras in the Supreme Court. For example, the most recent 
version of Specter’s bill (Senate Bill 446) had ten cosponsors. Senate Bill 446: A Bill to 
Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-446.  
 5. To Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, S. 446, 111th Cong. 
(2009); To Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, S. 344, 110th Cong. 
(2007); To Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, S. 1768, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 6. S. 446. 
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This short and seemingly simple bill has spurred considerable debate on both 
Congress’s ability to pass the bill from a constitutional standpoint and whether 
Congress should pass the bill regardless of its power to do so.
7
  
This Note attempts to resolve the two issues above by first briefly discussing the 
arguments concerning the constitutionality of the bill and then using game theory to 
analyze whether the bill is a good strategic move for Congress. The use of game 
theory provides a perspective not yet seen in the debate about cameras in the 
Supreme Court and reaches a somewhat counterintuitive conclusion. Specifically, 
the analysis suggests that, regardless of the bill’s constitutionality, Specter and 
Congress as a whole should not force the Court to allow cameras, but should 
instead use the strategies available to influence the Court to act on its own and 
voluntarily allow television cameras into its proceedings. 
Parts I and II of this Note lay out the history of the proposed legislation and 
develop the background for the arguments surrounding the issue. Part III discusses 
the bill’s constitutionality and how it affects the decisions of both Congress and the 
Supreme Court regarding the bill’s path to becoming, or not becoming, law.8 Part 
IV attempts to explain the course of Senate Bill 446 and its predecessors through 
the use of game theory—looking at the strategic analysis each branch applies when 
choosing how to act on the bill. The game is a losing one for Congress, so even 
discussing the bill is a waste of Congress’s time.9 Accordingly, neither the 
constitutionality nor game theory analysis answers the question as to why Senate 
Bill 446 was proposed in the first place. Thus, the real question is: Why has the 
legislation on this topic taken such an odd course and what can future members of 
Congress do to get cameras in the Supreme Court? Part V attempts to answer this 
question by offering underlying reasons Specter proposed the bill without the 
intention of it getting passed, and ultimately comes to the conclusion stated above. 
I. HISTORY OF SENATE BILL 446 AND ITS PREDECESSORS 
Specter did not initiate the debate over cameras in the Supreme Court.
10
 
Representative Frank J. Guarini Jr. sponsored a House concurrent resolution in the 
96th Congress to communicate to the Court that Congress believed television 
media should be granted access to cover oral arguments.
11
 Congress did not take 
action on the resolution, but it provided some of the earliest exposure that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody, “Supreme Court TV”: Televising the Least 
Accountable Branch, 33 J. LEGIS. 144 (2006); Brandon Smith, The Least Televised Branch: 
A Separation of Powers Analysis of Legislation to Televise the Supreme Court, 97 GEO. L.J. 
1409 (2009). See generally TONG, supra note 3. 
 8. The focus of this Note will remain on Senate Bill 446. The analysis would apply 
equally to former versions of the bill because they are identical. It would also presumably 
apply to future versions, assuming there are no substantial changes in substance. 
Accordingly, throughout this Note, any reference to Senate Bill 446 or “the bill” will be 
referencing legislation equivalent to Senate Bill 446 in substance, whether it came before or 
will come after Senate Bill 446. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See TONG, supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 11. TONG, supra note 3, at n.23. 
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debate over cameras in the Court received.
12
 Starting in the 105th Congress, 
Representative Steve Chabot picked up where Guarini left off by repeatedly 
proposing bills to mandate cameras in the Supreme Court.
13
 Senator Charles E. 
Grassley joined Chabot beginning in the 106th Congress and followed a similar, 
repetitive pattern of proposing legislation.
14
 Likewise, Specter joined the formal 
debate starting in the 106th Congress
15
 and repeatedly proposed legislation to 
mandate cameras in the Supreme Court until his career as a senator ended with the 
close of the 111th Congress.
16
 Specter’s bills are discussed in more detail below.  
Senate Bill 446 is the most recent of three bills that Specter proposed in the 
Senate to mandate television coverage of the Supreme Court.
17
 All three have been 
identical in form, but none have made it very far in the legislative process.
18
 
Specter introduced the first version, Senate Bill 1768, in the Senate in September 
2005.
19
 This version of the bill had seven cosponsors—four Democrats and three 
Republicans.
20
 Both Specter and Senator Leahy spoke on the bill, giving the Senate 
the opportunity to hear from members of both parties.
21
 In the end, Senate Bill 1768 
never got past the report filed by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
22
 Specter 
introduced the second version of the bill, Senate Bill 344, in January 2007.
23
 This 
version had five cosponsors—three Democrats and two Republicans.24 Specter was 
the only senator to offer any remarks on behalf of Senate Bill 344.
25
 Much like the 
former version noted above, Senate Bill 344 did not make it past a committee 
report filing, and therefore, was never enacted into law.
26
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Guarini introduced the resolution on October 2, 1980. Bill Summary & Status of 
House Concurrent Resolution 444 of the 96th Congress, H.R. Con. Res. 444, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d096:444:./list/bss/d096HC.lst::. On the 
same day, it was referred to the House Committee, but Congress never took further action. 
Id.  
 13. TONG, supra note 3, at n.23. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 17–32. 
 17. See supra note 5. See generally infra text accompanying notes 18–30. 
 18. See To Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, S. 446, 111th Cong. 
(2010); To Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, S. 344, 110th Cong. 
(2008); To Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, S. 1768, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 19. S. 1768. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See 151 CONG. REC. 21,222–26 (2005). 
 22. S. 1768: A Bill to Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1768. 
 23. S. 344. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See 153 CONG. REC. S831–34 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S 1257–62 
(daily ed. Jan. 29, 2007). 
 26. S. 344: A Bill to Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-344. 
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Specter’s final version of the bill was Senate Bill 446.27 He proposed the bill in 
the Senate in February 2009 and had significantly higher support with a total of ten 
cosponsors—eight Democrats and two Republicans.28 Like Senate Bill 344, this 
version only received remarks by Specter, but unlike both prior versions, did not 
have a written report prepared by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
29
 The last 
action date on the bill was June 8, 2010, when there was a nonwritten report by 
committee.
30
  
Now that the 111th Congress and Specter’s career as a senator have come to an 
end, Specter will not see his final version of the bill get passed into law.
31
 However, 
his farewell speech in the Senate included one last plea for his cause, asking 
Congress to force the Supreme Court to televise oral arguments.
32
 Whether a 
similar or identical bill will be proposed in the 112th
 
Congress is obviously a 
question that only time can answer; but given that Senate Bill 446 had ten 
cosponsors, it would not be surprising to see one of those senators, or even a 
member of the House of Representatives, step into a sponsor role.  
II. THE DEBATE SURROUNDING CAMERAS IN THE SUPREME COURT
33
 
The Supreme Court has never allowed any part of its proceedings to be 
photographed or video recorded.
34
 Both the media itself and Congress have 
pressured the Court to allow live coverage of oral arguments.
35
 The call for the 
Court to allow television media in its doors is not a recent development;
36
 however, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 28. S. 446, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 29. See Bill Summary & Status of House Concurrent Resolution 446 of the 111th 
Congress: All Congressional Actions, S. 446, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN00446:@@@X#. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Hulse, supra note 2. 
 32. “Congress could at least require televising the Court proceedings to provide some 
transparency to inform the public about what the Court is doing since it has the final word on 
the cutting issues of the day. Brandeis was right when he said that sunlight is the best 
disinfectant.” 156 CONG. REC. S10,854 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter).  
 33. This Part is not meant to take a stance on whether either side’s arguments in the 
debate surrounding cameras in the Supreme Court hold more merit. Rather, this is provided 
solely for a brief summary of background information that will be helpful in determining the 
elements both Congress and the Supreme Court will take into consideration when 
determining their respective future actions. 
 34. See TONG, supra note 3, at 2. 
 35. See generally, TONG, supra note 3, at 15–17; Bruce D. Collins, C-SPAN’s Long and 
Winding Road to a Still Un-televised Supreme Court, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
12 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/c-span-s-long-and-winding-road-to-a-
still-un-televised-supreme-court. 
 36. One of the earliest attempts to get cameras in the Supreme Court was introduced in 
1981 in the form of a resolution sponsored by Rep. Frank J. Guarini Jr., but no formal 
attempts at legislation ensued. See TONG, supra note 3, at 6 n.23.  
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it has gained support in recent years.
37
 As noted previously, Specter has been a 
source of such pressure by repeatedly proposing a bill “[t]o permit the televising of 
Supreme Court proceedings.”38 The bill would require the Court to allow media 
outlets to install television cameras that would record video during oral 
arguments.
39
 The bill would not have a direct effect on any other part of the Court’s 
day-to-day operations.
40
 Despite the increased pressure, the Court remains steadfast 
in its resistance to allowing television cameras into its courtroom.
41
  
A. Arguments in Favor of Televising Supreme Court Oral Arguments 
One of the main arguments put forth in favor of television Court coverage is the 
educational benefits offered to the public by doing so. Proponents point out that 
allowing the public to view the proceedings will, among other things, enable better 
understanding of how the Court works.
42
 Additionally, Specter expressly stated that 
such an argument was a part of the rationale for his bill.
43
 Even Supreme Court 
Justices have indicated their appreciation for the educational benefits that television 
coverage can offer.
44
 However, the education argument on its own has not 
persuaded the Court to change its stance on the subject.
45
 Chief Justice Roberts 
even went so far as to point out that oral arguments are not intended for education; 
rather, they are intended to help the Justices decide the case at hand.
46
 
The second main argument relies on the idea that government should be 
presumptively open. This argument raises constitutional concerns among Justices 
and academics.
47
 The general idea was summarized by Professor Michael C. Dorf
48
 
as follows: “Courts are a vital component of our government, and in a democracy, 
the work of government should be presumptively open. That principle flows from 
the First Amendment, which mandates that, absent special security or privacy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Id. at 1. 
 38. S. 446, 111th Cong. § 678 (2009); S. 344, 110th Cong. § 678 (2007); S. 1768, 109th 
Cong. § 678 (2005). 
 39. See S. 446; S. 344; S. 1768. 
 40. See S. 446; S. 344; S. 1768. 
 41. See Dorf, supra note 1.  
 42. TONG, supra note 3, at 17.  
 43. 151 CONG. REC. 21,223 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (arguing in favor 
of Senate Bill 1768, a predecessor that was identical in form and substance to his current 
proposed bill). 
 44. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“[T]elevision is capable of performing an educational function by acquainting the public 
with the judicial process in action.”). 
 45. See supra note 35. 
 46. Bob Egelko, Supreme Court: Chief Justice Vetoes Idea of Televised Hearings, S.F. 
CHRON., July 14, 2006, at B6 (“We don’t have oral arguments to show the public how we 
function. We have them to learn about a particular case in a particular way.”). 
 47. See infra Part III. 
 48. Michael C. Dorf is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law at Cornell University 
Law School and has published more than fifty law review articles on constitutional law and 
related subjects. His legal writing also includes books, columns, and a blog. Michael C. 
Dorf, Professional Biography, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio.cfm?id=333.  
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concerns, court proceedings should be open to the press and public.”49 The 
Supreme Court arguably already fulfills this idea by releasing audio recordings of 
oral arguments
50
 and allowing certain accommodations for the press.
51
 For 
example, the Court provides the media with work space in a press room, sets aside 
special seating for reporters covering announcements and oral arguments, and 
allows entry to sketch artists to sketch courtroom scenes.
52
 On the other hand, the 
Court’s accommodation to the public has been criticized because seating is quite 
limited not only in space but also in time.
53
 A comparison has also been drawn 
between congressional proceedings, which are open to television media, and 
Supreme Court oral arguments. The underlying issue stems from a supposed 
inadequate distinction between the two that should give the Court the right to keep 
its doors closed to cameras.
54
 Lastly, the general public convincingly favors the 
idea of cameras in the Supreme Court over the Court’s current ban on video 
recording during proceedings.
55
 
B. Arguments in Opposition of Televising Supreme Court Oral Arguments 
Opponents of cameras in the Supreme Court rely on three main arguments: (1) 
forcing the Court to allow them would be unconstitutional;
56
 (2) even if mandating 
cameras was constitutional, it would be an “imprudent intrusion into the Court’s 
decision-making process”;57 and (3) it would have a negative effect on the Court by 
undermining its legitimacy.
58
 The first two are complex issues that will be 
discussed in detail in Part III.
59
 The third has several aspects to it that are discussed 
in this subpart. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. See Dorf, supra note 1. 
 50. See TONG, supra note 3, at 2. 
 51. See generally Stephen J. Wermiel, News Media Coverage of the United States 
Supreme Court, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1059, 1069–76 (1998). 
 52. Id. at 1070.  
 53. The Supreme Court courtroom is only eighty-two feet by ninety-one feet, which 
provides for limited numbers of seats. Audrey Maness, Does the First Amendment’s “Right 
of Access” Require Court Proceedings to be Televised? A Constitutional and Practical 
Discussion, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 123, 127 (2006). Additionally, even if a member of the public 
does make it to the front of one of the two lines to get to see part of the proceedings, they are 
limited to three minutes of viewing. Id. 
 54. Id. at 182.  
 55. See TONG, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing a 2006 public opinion survey showing that 
70% of voters think allowing cameras in the Supreme Court is a “good idea”). 
 56. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 7, at 1433–34. 
 57. Dorf, supra note 1. 
 58. See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody, Constitutional Etiquette and the Fate of “Supreme 
Court TV,” 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 19 (2007), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/constitutional-etiquette-and-the-fate-of-supreme-
court-tv; Christina B. Whitman, Televising the Court: A Category Mistake, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 5 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/televising-the-
court-a-category-mistake; Dorf, supra note 1. 
 59. The constitutionality of mandating cameras in the Supreme Court is a topic on 
which entire papers have been written. See, e.g., Peabody, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 7. 
2012] TELEVISING THE SUPREME COURT 485 
 
 
Both academics and Justices have two key concerns regarding the effects that 
Senate Bill 446 would have on the Court and its legitimacy. First, they worry about 
the entertainment aspect of television coverage.
60
 Justice Scalia showed this 
concern in a broad sense in 2005 when he said, “We don’t want to become 
entertainment. I think there’s something sick about making entertainment out of 
real people’s legal problems. I don’t like it in the lower courts, and I particularly 
don’t like it in the Supreme Court.”61 Additionally, some argue that the mere 
presence of cameras would create a tendency in both lawyers and Justices to use 
theatrics solely for the benefit of television viewers.
62
 But the most noted concern is 
how the media itself would handle the footage after the proceedings are concluded. 
While C-SPAN has made clear it would televise the proceedings “gavel-to-
gavel,”63 what other news outlets would do with the footage might mislead the 
public.
64
 Justice Burger elaborated such a concern when he said: “If there were 
some way of them saying that any part of that, any segment, could not be produced 
without all the rest of it, conceivably, that might open things up.”65 He also made 
clear his view that selective coverage of Court proceedings “would be ‘bad for the 
country, bad for the court and bad for the administration of justice’ because 
networks would use snippets of the arguments that would give the public a 
‘distorted conception.’”66 Ultimately, these concerns all relate back to their possible 
impact on the Court’s legitimacy, which is understandably a key concern, 
especially for the Justices.
67
 
                                                                                                                 
Discussing it in this subpart would not allow for enough detail to get the full picture, so it is 
developed in Part III with admittedly limited detail given the expansiveness of the overall 
debate on the constitutional issues regarding such legislation. 
 60. See, e.g., TONG, supra note 3, at 12. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Dorf, supra note 1. 
 63. Collins, supra note 35, at 12. 
 64. Eleanor Randolph & Al Kamen, Chief Justice Considers Televising Supreme Court: 
Burger Opposes Selective Coverage of Proceedings, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1986, at A5. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. Based on my research to date, I have been unable to find an instance where a 
Justice has elaborated on how specifically the media would be able to use snippets in ways 
substantially different than they are already able through the use of audio recordings. While 
the following is only conjecture, it may be that the Justices are worried about facial 
expressions being overanalyzed or paired with audio from a noncorresponding snippet of 
video. The use of editing by television media could, therefore, easily take a statement and 
pair it with a facial response of a Justice to make a story more interesting or controversial at 
the expense of the reputation of a Justice or the Court as a whole. 
 67. See Marjorie Cohn, Let the Sun Shine on the Supreme Court, 35 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 161, 163 (2008) (“Chief Justice William Rehnquist told a 1992 conference of judges 
that if the justices didn’t look good on camera, ‘it would lessen to a certain extent some of 
the mystique and moral authority’ of the Court.”). This, combined with the Court’s express 
knowledge that it relies solely on its legitimacy, makes clear why the Justices are concerned 
with actions that may limit their ability to function. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of 
substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to 
determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”).  
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SENATE BILL 446 
The proposal of Senate Bill 446, and similar bills before it, has spurred much 
debate as to whether Congress has the power to enact it as legislation.
68
 While 
questions regarding specific amendments have arisen,
69
 the main focus of the 
debate lies in whether Senate Bill 446 violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 
However, even if the bill passes the test of constitutionality in an abstract sense, 
issues regarding judicial independence remain.
70
 
A. Separation of Powers 
In response to a question from Specter in 2007 regarding one of Specter’s 
predecessors to Senate Bill 446, Justice Kennedy warned Specter that his proposed 
legislation may violate separation of powers: “A majority of my court feels very 
strongly . . . that televising our proceedings would change our collegial dynamic. 
We hope that the respect that separation of powers and checks and balances implies 
would persuade you to accept our judgment in this regard.”71 Kennedy’s statement 
clearly illustrates that, in the Court’s view, Senate Bill 446 would either not survive 
a constitutional challenge, or would otherwise result in a conflict between Congress 
and the Court. Justice Kennedy’s warning, while somewhat cryptic in what would 
be its practical effect, undoubtedly should concern anyone seeking the passage of 
Senate Bill 446 and may have deterred congressional action on the issue thus far.
72
 
Because separation of powers is not written anywhere in the Constitution but is 
rather embedded in its structure,
73
 the question of the proposed bill’s 
constitutionality comes down to whether Congress has an enumerated power that 
would allow it to control the Court in regard to its policy on television coverage of 
proceedings.
74
  
The Court may not view Senate Bill 446 as constitutional,
75
 but proponents of 
the bill maintain several arguments that aim to prove otherwise. Most of the 
arguments focus on the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I of the 
Constitution.
76
 Although the Constitution created the Supreme Court, it is long 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. See, e.g., Peabody, supra note 7, at 167–72; Smith, supra note 7, at 1415–16; Dorf, 
supra note 1. 
 69. See, e.g., Maness, supra note 53; Peabody, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 7. 
 70. See Dorf, supra note 1 (“There are many constitutionally-valid laws that Congress 
could pass that would nonetheless threaten judicial independence.”). 
 71. Judicial Security and Independence: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 12 (2007). 
 72. See infra Part V.  
 73. Smith, supra note 7, at 1419.  
 74. Scott E. Gant & Bruce G. Peabody, Debate: Congress’s Power to Compel the 
Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 46, 52 (2007), 
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=9 (“The Court has 
observed many times what the Constitution itself makes clear: Congress may act only if 
authorized by one of the powers delegated to it by the Constitution.”). 
 75. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., Peabody, supra note 7, at 159. 
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established that Congress was left with the authority to control many aspects of the 
Court, such as the number of Justices, the attendance required for quorum, and the 
details of the Court’s Term start and end dates.77 The Court itself has indicated an 
acceptance of this premise in Wiley v. Coastal Corp.
78
 when Justice Rehnquist 
wrote that “[f]rom almost the founding days of this country, it has been firmly 
established that Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to make all laws 
‘necessary and proper’ . . . may enact laws regulating the conduct of those [federal] 
courts and the means by which their judgments are enforced.”79 Note, however, that 
this excerpt, along with others used by proponents of the constitutionality of Senate 
Bill 446, refers to federal courts generally, and not specifically the Supreme 
Court.
80
 This distinction may prove significant because the Constitution expressly 
grants Congress power over federal courts in two places, while it does not 
expressly give Congress the power to control the Supreme Court. However, to 
further the argument that Congress has the ability to control the Court’s 
proceedings, at least to some degree, is the fact that Section 5 of Article I expressly 
gives Congress the right to “determine the rules of [Congress’s] proceedings.”81 
Notably, there is not any similar language in Article III, which establishes the 
judiciary.
82
 The absence of the language can be inferred to mean that the Court 
does not have the power to determine the rules of its own proceedings, making 
something like television coverage within the realm of whoever does have the 
power over procedural rules. Therefore, through both the interpretation of Article 
III’s lack of a clause giving the Court control of its procedural rules and the history 
of congressional acts—referring specifically to the examples already mentioned 
where Congress exerted control over aspects of the Court—it is clear that Congress 
has, and does in fact maintain, some control over the Court and its functions.
83
 
The question then arises as to whether Senate Bill 446 extends beyond the 
limited control that Congress does have over the Court.
84
 In a debate in 2007 
between Scott Gant
85
 and Professor Bruce Peabody,
86
 Gant said that a bill like 
Senate Bill 446 “can only be supported by a reading of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause that seemingly places no meaningful limits on Congress’s power, and lacks 
due regard for the separation of powers principles that infuse the Constitution.”87 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See 151 Cong. Rec. 21,225 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).  
 78. 503 U.S. 131 (1992). 
 79. Id. at 136. 
 80. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (“[E]nactments 
‘rationally capable of classification’ as procedural rules are necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the power to establish federal courts vested in Congress by Article 
III, § 1.” (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965))). 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. III; Peabody, supra note 7, at 163 n.112. 
 84. Cf. supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 85. Scott E. Gant is a Partner at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP and an author on 
constitutional law. Gant & Peabody, supra note 74, at 52 n.†. 
 86. Professor Bruce Peabody is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Farleigh 
Dickinson University. Id. at 47 n.†. 
 87. Id. at 55. 
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Peabody, by looking to McCulloch v. Maryland
88
 and its “legitimate” constitutional 
end test,
89
 concluded that this would be “a defensible exercise of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause given a variety of legitimate objectives that would . . . enhance 
governmental accountability, not to mention the judicial power itself.”90 Ultimately, 
this debate is a matter of constitutional interpretation that may or may not have a 
clear answer, and it is doubtful that one will surface capable of changing either 
side’s mind. However, the absence of a clear-cut answer makes this topic more 
prime for political and strategic moves by both Congress and the Court. In this 
scenario, either branch could presumably take any action with Senate Bill 446 that 
it wants and still support it with a “legitimate” argument as to the action’s 
constitutionality. Conversely, if the Constitution spoke directly on the issue, this 
debate would be a moot point and it would be much more difficult for either branch 
to act in a way that does not stay within obvious legal constraints.  
B. Judicial Independence 
As noted above, Justice Kennedy has voiced his opinion in opposition to 
Specter’s proposal: 
We have always taken the position and decided cases that it is not for 
the Court to tell the Congress how to conduct its proceedings, what its 
rules ought to be on markups and reporting bills from one House to the 
other, or how to conduct itself. And we feel very strongly that we have 
intimate knowledge of the dynamics and the needs of the Court. We 
think that proposals which would mandate direct television in our Court 
in every proceeding is inconsistent with that deference, that etiquette, 
that should apply between the branches.
91
 
Although this quote has been interpreted as a hint to Congress that the bill would be 
unconstitutional,
92
 its language has also been interpreted to suggest that if the bill 
were constitutional, it would nonetheless be an unjustifiable infringement on the 
Court in light of the respect due the Court as a coordinate branch of government.
93
  
Those who argue it does not infringe tend to focus on the premise that it would 
not affect the Court’s decision-making process.94 Specifically, because it does not 
literally affect how the Court would function in terms of its procedures, proponents 
say the Court’s proceedings will look and be no different than before cameras were 
present.
95
 It is also worth noting that historically the Court had referred to the size 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 89. Id. at 421. 
 90. Gant & Peabody, supra note 74, at 58. 
 91. Hearings Before a Subcomm. on the Dep’t of Transp., Treasury, HUD, the 
Judiciary, D.C., & Indep. Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 109th Cong. 226 
(2006) (statement of J. Anthony M. Kennedy). 
 92. Dorf, supra note 1.  
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Gant & Peabody, supra note 74, at 51. 
 95. Id. 
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and obtrusiveness of cameras as a key concern over televising court proceedings.
96
 
Today’s technology completely negates such an argument since the proceedings 
could be videotaped discreetly, presumably in ways that no one would even have to 
know cameras were present.
97
  
On the other side of the debate, even Specter has hinted that his proposed bill 
may not show the constitutional etiquette to which Justice Kennedy referred.
98
 In a 
floor speech regarding one of his camera bills, Specter complained about multiple 
Supreme Court decisions citing a lack of respect for Congress.
99
 Specter showed 
particular disapproval of the Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison100 
because he did not agree with the Court questioning Congress’s “method of 
reasoning” while partially striking down the Violence Against Women Act.101 
Justice Kennedy responded in a way that may exemplify the typical attitude of the 
Justices on the matter by noting that in Morrison, “[the Court] didn’t tell Congress 
how to conduct its proceedings. We said that, in a given statute, we could not find 
in the evidence that Congress had shown us that interstate commerce was 
involved.”102 Justice Kennedy’s statements noted above, combined with the 
sentiments of the other Justices, make it fairly safe to assume that the Court would 
view the passage of Senate Bill 446 as, at the very least, an unjustified intrusion on 
judicial independence.
103
 The bill’s questionable constitutionality and intrusion 
unto judicial independence raise one more question: Who gets to decide? 
Marbury v. Madison
104
 is considered one of the most important Supreme Court 
decisions in the nation’s history because, through declaring an act of Congress 
unconstitutional, it established “the authority for the judiciary to review the 
constitutionality of executive and legislative acts.”105 Although the holding of the 
case has been questioned as to its breadth,
106
 and the Constitution is silent regarding 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965); Maness, supra note 53, at 142. 
 97. Collins, supra note 35, at 15. 
 98. Tony Mauro, The Right Legislation for the Wrong Reasons, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 8, 10 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/the-right-
legislation-for-the-wrong-reasons (arguing in reference to one of Specter’s floor speeches 
that “it is hard not to conclude Specter’s objective is not merely to let the sun shine in, but 
also to train an accusatory spotlight on the Justices”). 
 99. Id. (noting Specter’s disapproval of, among others, United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); and Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)). 
 100. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
 101. One interpretation of Specter’s statements regarding Morrison was characterized as 
essentially asking the question: “What makes the Supreme Court think it is smarter than 
Congress?” Mauro, supra note 98, at 10.  
 102. Id. at 11. 
 103. The most prominent example of the Court’s view on a bill such as Senate Bill 446 is 
the oft-quoted statement of Justice Souter who said, “The day you see a camera come into 
our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead body.” TONG, supra note 3, at 1. 
 104. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 105. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 39 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 106. In a 1994 paper, Professor Clinton criticized the prominent view of the Marbury 
holding and came to the conclusion that the holding is narrower than it has been given credit 
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the Court’s ability to review the constitutionality of actions of the other branches, 
the Court’s authority in this regard has been generally accepted since the time of 
Marbury.
107
  
Presuming this legislation would get challenged in the Court if passed into law, 
Congress and the public would find out how far the Supreme Court is willing to 
take its authority for judicial review. Specter acknowledged that although he 
believes his bill is constitutional, “[s]uch a conclusion is not free from doubt and is 
highly likely to be tested with the Supreme Court, as usual, having the final 
word.”108 So it appears that the Court will have the opportunity to strike the bill 
down as unconstitutional if it so desires, but only if the bill actually gets passed into 
law. As of yet, Congress has not passed Senate Bill 446 or any other bill like it,
109
 
and whether or not Congress will pass the bill in the future can be analyzed in the 
context of game theory. 
IV. A GAME THEORY APPROACH TO SENATE BILL 446 
While it is useful to first explore whether Senate Bill 446’s constitutionality is 
clear or at least heavily favored one way, the answer to the question remains 
essentially wide open, so a constitutional analysis alone does not give an adequate 
explanation of both the history and likely future of cameras in the Supreme Court. 
However, game theory can explain the previous moves and predict the future 
moves of Congress and the Court.  
Academics have used game theory to discuss and analyze legal situations for 
many years.
110
 It is a social science developed around the idea of strategic thinking 
in decision making.
111
 Generally, game theorists refer to the actors in each game as 
“players,” and each player’s optimal move, or “decision,” is dependent upon what 
they expect the other player(s) will do.
112
 In other words, game theory is a way to 
analyze how to best act in a given situation by putting one’s self in another player’s 
shoes to analyze how each player will react to each set of possible moves.
113
 The 
analysis often uses decision trees to visually display each player’s available and 
most likely moves.
114
 This type of analysis requires each player to make 
                                                                                                                 
for. He argued that the case can be viewed as “justifying at most the Court’s power to nullify 
national laws in cases bearing directly upon the exercise of judicial functions.” Robert 
Lowry Clinton, Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review: A 
Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v. Madison, AM. J. POL. SCI., May 1994, at 285, 296. 
Whether Clinton’s view would matter in a case determining the constitutionality of Senate 
Bill 446 would depend on whether cameras would affect a “judicial function,” which relates 
to the arguments in Part II above.  
 107. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 105, at 39. 
 108. 151 CONG. REC. 21,225 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
 109. See supra Part I. 
 110. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 106; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? 
Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991). 
 111. AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 1–2 (1991). 
 112. Id. at 36.  
 113. See id.; Garth Saloner, Modeling, Game Theory, and Strategic Management, 12 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 119, 120 (1991).  
 114. For examples of decision trees used by game theorists, see DIXIT & NALEBUFF, 
supra note 111, at 34–40. 
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assumptions about the other player’s rationality, his or her own rationality, and the 
amount of information each player is privy to.
115
  
William N. Eskridge Jr. was one of the early authors to use game theory to 
explain the interaction between the three branches of the U.S. government as 
applied to civil rights.
116
 Eskridge’s model analyzed the interplay between all three 
branches regarding civil rights legislation and litigation based on multiple models 
of judicial reasoning.
117
 Fortunately, the model generally applies to the interaction 
of the branches in regards to Senate Bill 446, with only a few parts of the game 
needing alteration for this purpose. Eskridge’s model places significant emphasis 
on the political preferences of the players on a sliding scale.
118
 While his method 
worked well with civil rights legislation and litigation, the debate surrounding 
cameras in the Supreme Court has a clearer divide and, unlike civil rights issues, 
political affiliation does not seem to be a determining factor as to which side of the 
debate a political player will fall.
119
 However, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight later 
adapted Eskridge’s model for application to the strategic model of judicial decision 
making.
120
 This Note will apply the Epstein and Knight version because it focuses 
not on a spectrum of preferences but rather on the interplay between the branches in 
what are essentially yes/no scenarios.
121
  
A. The Players and Rules of the Game 
Analyzing an interaction using game theory first requires laying out the 
parameters and any underlying assumptions.
122
 In the “cameras in the Supreme 
Court” game, the players are similar to the Epstein and Knight model.123 The 
Supreme Court, Congress, and the states will all interact in determining their own 
actions and therefore the ultimate outcome. The main differences are (1) the 
decisions are yes/no as to whether cameras in the Supreme Court should be 
mandated by statute; (2) Congress is the first mover instead of the Supreme Court; 
and (3) the states are the third player instead of the President.
124
 This is a sequential 
game and, more importantly, a repeated game with presumably indefinite 
repetitions. The importance of a game being repeated is that the players know they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. Saloner, supra note 113, at 120. 
 116. See Eskridge, supra note 110. 
 117. See generally id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. While there may be some correlation, political party affiliation is not determinative 
in how a politician will view Senate Bill 446 or similar legislation, as evidenced by the 
mixture of cosponsors in each of Specter’s three bills to mandate cameras in the Supreme 
Court. See supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text. 
 120. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 14 (1998). 
 121. Id. at 10–17. 
 122. See Eskridge, supra note 110, at 643–44. 
 123. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 120, at 14. 
 124. Id. The President is replaced with the states because Article V of the Constitution 
does not require the President to act in order for a constitutional amendment to take effect, 
but does require ratification by thirty-eight states. U.S. CONST. art. V. The analysis is limited 
to constitutional amendments because that is the main recourse available to Congress should 
the game progress past the first three moves. See infra Part IV.B. 
492 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:479 
 
 
will have to deal with each other again in the future. This repetition creates a higher 
incentive to cooperate with one another to maximize long-term benefits. If this 
were not the case, there would be no fear of future consequences, such as revenge, 
and the overall strategy of the game would be significantly different.
125
  
For this Note’s analysis, it is assumed that the players are acting with complete 
information as to the other players’ preferences and available strategies.126 The 
analysis also assumes that each of the players ultimately wants to get to their 
desired outcome without being overturned by one of the other players.
127
 The 
assumption that players have a desired outcome requires an additional assumption 
that the Court follows a strategic model, similar to that set out in Epstein and 
Knight,
128
 because if the Court only interprets law then it would have no basis to 
make strategic moves towards its desired outcome. Additionally, this analysis 
assumes that Congress as a group agrees with Specter and wants to mandate 
cameras in the Court. Lastly, at least for the rules and assumptions of the game, this 
is a zero-sum game. In other words, Congress wants cameras in the Supreme Court, 
while the Justices do not.
129
 In this game, one wins and the other loses so there is 
no real possibility for a win-win situation.
130
 However, as will be shown below, 
there will be strategies for minimizing losses and maximizing gains. 
B. Possible Outcomes and Strategy 
There are several levels of the cameras in the Supreme Court game.
131
 They are 
most easily explained through the modified decision tree shown below.
132
 As 
shown and previously mentioned, Congress is the first mover in this game. If 
Congress decides not to pass Senate Bill 446 then the game ends and the Supreme 
Court gets what it wants. The top box is likely a special case because neither party 
has actually “won” or “lost” in the eyes of the public—neither branch has been 
overridden and the Court has not been infringed upon—which may make a 
significant difference in how that outcome is viewed by the players.
133
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Cf. DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 111, at 115–18 (discussing the importance of 
repetition in a prisoner’s dilemma between Congress and the Federal Reserve regarding 
fiscal policy decisions). 
 126. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 110, at 644. 
 127. Id.  
 128. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 120, at 11. Whether or not the Court is actually 
strategic in its decision making is a debate beyond the scope of this Note, but it will be taken 
as true for the remainder of the analysis. Otherwise, the game theoretic analysis used by 
Eskridge and Epstein and Knight would no longer apply. Additionally, there has been 
considerable research and literature indicating that the Court does not limit itself to the legal 
model of judicial decision making; but rather takes strategy and personal preferences into 
account. Id. 
 129. See supra Parts I & II. 
 130. In this context, a win-win situation is referring to a situation where both players gain 
some amount of utility, however small. Here, one wins while the other loses so someone will 
have negative utility in the outcome of the game. 
 131. See Eskridge, supra note 110, at 644.  
 132. See id. 
 133. See infra Part V. 
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As shown in the decision tree in Figure 1, Congress has the ability to override a 
Supreme Court decision,
134
 and it is also worth noting that Congress has used its 
power to do so on many occasions.
135
 If the Court were to overturn Senate Bill 446, 
it would effectively deem the goal of the legislation unconstitutional and therefore 
a mere statutory adjustment would not trump the Court’s decision. So for the 
purposes of this debate, it appears that a constitutional amendment is Congress’s 
only recourse. However, overriding a decision is not an easy task, especially 
through a constitutional amendment. Further, the only situations in the decision tree 
in which Senate Bill 446 would pass and withstand a legal challenge are where 
either: (1) the Supreme Court cooperates (submits to the will of Congress); or (2) a 
congressional committee, Congress as a whole, and the states all work against the 
Court. While the decision tree provides a useful diagram of the possible outcomes, 
it does not give the full picture by itself because each player’s strategy will vary 
depending on their individual preferences and the likelihood their actions will 
impact the outcome of the game.  
 
Figure 1: Congress vs. Supreme Court—Full Decision Tree 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. See Eskridge, supra note 110, at 644. 
 135. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1155, 1163–64 (2007) (“Scholars estimate that in recent years, Congress has 
overridden about five percent of the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions, and the Court has 
invited overrides to clarify the law in about eight percent of its cases.”). 
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C. Likely Future Moves 
The likely future moves of the players in this game rely on both the above 
decision tree and other environmental factors that the players will incorporate into 
their strategies. Or, as Epstein and Knight put it:  
[S]trategic decision making is about interdependent choice: an 
individual’s action is, in part, a function of her expectations about the 
actions of others . . . . But strategic considerations do not simply 
involve calculations over what colleagues will do. Justices must also 
consider the preferences of other political actors, including Congress, 
the president, and even the public. The logic here is as follows. As 
every student of American politics knows, two main concepts undergird 
our constitutional system. The first is the separation of powers doctrine, 
under which each of the branches has a distinct function: the legislature 
makes the laws, the executive implements those laws, and the judiciary 
interprets them. The second is the notion of checks and balances: each 
branch of government imposes limits on the primary function of the 
others.
136
  
While this is the logic that will be applied, the discussion in this Note is limited 
to the strategic concerns of Congress and the Supreme Court.
137
  
The majority of the game’s decision making will be done in the first few steps 
because of the assumption that none of the players want their actions overridden. 
Accordingly, the decision tree simplifies to the version shown in Figure 2, below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 120, at 12–13 (emphasis in original).  
 137. The President is ignored because the analysis focuses on the steps for constitutional 
amendments, which do not require action from the President, only the Legislature and the 
states. U.S. CONST. art. V.  
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Figure 2: Congress vs. Supreme Court—Modified Decision Tree 
 
 
 
Game theory generally calls for players to look at end results and work 
backwards to determine how to either maximize gain or minimize loss.
138
 In the 
case of Senate Bill 446, Congress would look to the third and fourth tiers of the 
decision tree, where either the congressional committee or Congress as a whole 
must choose to override the Court’s ruling through a constitutional amendment. If 
Congress is at this point in the game, it is no longer really in a gain-maximizing 
position because the only way it could get to that point is through a Supreme Court 
decision striking down Senate Bill 446. Therefore, Congress already does not like 
its position, and the difficulty in overriding the Court’s decision is costly and 
unlikely (based on historical interactions).
139
 It can then be presumed that although 
there is the possibility that Congress could overturn the Court’s decision, it is not 
likely under normal circumstances.
140
 Because getting cameras in the Supreme 
Court is not a topic in which voters have a large concern,
141
 it is also reasonable to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.  
 139. See Frank B. Cross & Frank J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2001) (noting a “laundry list of 
factors that reduce the probability of legislative response,” including the substantial 
transaction costs of doing so). 
 140. Id. at 1454 (“[T]he risk of any given decision being overridden appears to be quite 
low and the probabilistic magnitude of that risk difficult for the Court to assess. Yet the risk 
is not zero, as we know from Eskridge and others that some number of Court opinions are in 
fact overridden.”). 
 141. See infra notes 166–69 and accompanying text. 
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say that Senate Bill 446 falls under what would be considered normal 
circumstances and a Court decision is, therefore, unlikely to be overturned.  
The next part of the analysis takes one step back in the process and looks at how 
the Supreme Court would come to a decision if Senate Bill 446 was passed as 
legislation.
142
 If, as is one of the assumptions of the game, there is perfect 
information amongst the players, the Court would know that Congress would be 
unlikely to overturn the Court’s decision should it strike down Senate Bill 446. 
This assumption mimics reality and what many scholars view as the Court’s 
presumption, or at least what should be the Court’s presumption.143 Frank B. 
Cross
144
 and Frank J. Nelson
145
 refer to this concept as the “risk of reversal 
probability.”146 They argue that the many structural barriers inherent in Congress—
such as its bicameral structure and its committee system—make the probability of a 
congressional override low.
147
 They further point out that in such a situation, the 
Court generally should not take Congress’s preferences into account when making 
its decision because there is not only a small likelihood of a Court decision being 
overridden, but also the Court should not want to be known to defer to Congress.
148
 
Accordingly, the Court should strike down Senate Bill 446 if it was passed into 
law.  
To test the strategy above, assume the Court did strike down Senate Bill 446. 
Only two things could happen. The most likely result is that it would remain 
stricken and the Court would uphold both of its goals—keeping cameras out of its 
courtroom and not being overridden by another branch. The other possible (and 
unlikely) result would include the Court losing on both counts by getting 
overridden and getting cameras installed in its courtroom. While the second and 
unlikely option sounds significantly worse, it is not as bad as it may seem. Assume 
instead that the Court feared a congressional override enough that it upheld Senate 
Bill 446. In this situation the only difference is that the Court has not technically 
been overridden. The Court still loses on the fight over cameras in its courtroom, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. The analysis assumes the Court prefers to keep cameras out of its courtroom. While 
Justices have, on occasion, expressed the possibility that they would consider allowing 
cameras in the Court, they nearly unanimously show their skepticism to the idea. See Matt 
Sundquist, Cameras and the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 29, 2010, 8:17AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/cameras-and-the-supreme-court/. Additionally, 
television coverage of proceedings is even more likely to receive a negative reaction from 
the Justices if forced upon them instead of giving them the autonomy to make their own 
choice.  
 143. See Cross & Nelson, supra note 139, at 1452; Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-
Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 31 
(1997). 
 144. “Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law at the McCombs 
School, University of Texas, and Professor of Law at the University of Texas Law School.” 
See Cross & Nelson, supra note 139, at 1437 n.*. 
 145. “Assistant Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, 
Harrisburg.” See id. at 1437 n.**. 
 146. Cross & Nelson, supra note 139, at 1452.  
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 1453 (“[A] strategic judiciary would not establish a reputation of readily 
deferring to Congress.”). 
2012] TELEVISING THE SUPREME COURT 497 
 
 
and how much worse is an overriding than being forced into televised proceedings 
when the Justices have already been so publicly against them? Even an open 
proponent of the proposed bill, Professor Dorf, acknowledges that the mere act of 
proposing the bill “show[s] disrespect for the Court as an institution.”149 So it 
appears that even in the unlikely event that Congress did override the decision 
through a constitutional amendment, the difference in the loss might not be 
significant. Further, and in the more likely case, the Court would actually benefit 
from the attempt because it would presumably have precedent that might bar future 
attempts by Congress to force the Court to allow televised oral arguments. The 
likely outcomes insinuate a high likelihood that the Court would strike down 
Senate Bill 446 because by doing so, the Court maximizes its expected benefit and 
exposes itself to a limited downside.
150
  
The analysis concludes by coming back to the first move, where Congress 
decides whether to enact Senate Bill 446 into law. Based on the analysis above, 
Congress can be fairly certain the bill would get overturned when challenged in the 
Court. Therefore, Congress has two basic options. It can enact Senate Bill 446 
knowing the bill is unlikely to succeed and may even result in adverse precedent, 
which would make future attempts more difficult.
151
 Or Congress can choose not to 
enact the bill. Based on the fact that Senate Bill 446 is the third attempt at such 
legislation,
152
 it would appear that Congress has analyzed the game in a similar 
fashion and has chosen not to pass the bill. However, if Congress were using such a 
simplistic approach, it would have been proposed once and never shown up again 
because it did not make strategic sense. By the same logic, the bill would not have 
been proposed in the first place unless it was to test the Supreme Court’s preference 
by making the idea public. Therefore, there likely exists a different reasoning 
behind Congress’s actions thus far.153  
D. Possible Alternative Moves and Explanations 
Congress can use two other options to achieve its goal of getting cameras into 
the Court. First, if Congress could change the analysis of the game in the third and 
fourth stages, it could alter the strategies all the way back to the beginning. 
Specifically, if it could somehow prove to the Court that it was so serious about the 
legislation that it would seek a constitutional amendment if the Court struck down 
Senate Bill 446, it would undoubtedly lessen the likelihood that the Court would 
strike Senate Bill 446 and Congress may have a chance of successfully getting 
cameras in the Supreme Court—and more importantly, keeping them there. 
However, many of the obstacles to congressional action mentioned above are not 
easily changed and, therefore, Congress is unlikely to actually utilize such a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. Dorf, supra note 1.  
 150. This decision may not be as clear cut as it seems, because striking Senate Bill 446 
may be viewed by the public as self-serving or unconstitutional, and evidence shows that the 
Court is swayed, at least to a degree, by public opinion. See infra notes 184–85 and 
accompanying text.  
 151. See supra Part IV.B. 
 152. See supra notes 17–30 and accompanying text.  
 153. See infra Part V. 
498 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:479 
 
 
strategy.
154
 As a second option, Congress can essentially bully the Court into 
allowing cameras without legislation forcing the Court to do so. This coercion is 
accomplished through what Cross and Nelson referred to as “resource 
punishment.”155 Using this strategy, Congress could withhold salary increases and 
cut other budgetary resources until the Court agrees to allow cameras in its 
courtroom.
156
 While such a tactic generally works on the Court,
157
 “[t]he effect [is] 
not an enormous one and not entirely consistent.”158 
Since neither of Congress’s two options seem likely,159 it is probably impossible 
to answer the question as to exactly why legislation regarding cameras in the 
Supreme Court has taken such an odd course over the past several years using 
game theory alone. Additionally, even assuming the above analysis is complete, it 
merely shows why the legislation has not been passed; it does not show why 
Specter would bother proposing it in the first place knowing it would fail.  
V. THE REAL EXPLANATION AND THE FUTURE OF CAMERAS IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 
The explanation provided by a game theory analysis, albeit a complete 
explanation on its face, fails to adequately answer the question as to why the 
proposed legislation has taken such an odd course. It fails due to both the expected 
outcome
160
 and because one of the key assumptions of the model is that both 
Congress and the Supreme Court do not want to be overturned.
161
 Some research 
supports this assumption and it may be a generally accepted view, but it does not 
hold true in all circumstances.
162
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.  
 155. Cross & Nelson, supra note 139, at 1465. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1468 (“There is empirical evidence that Congress pays attention to Supreme 
Court decisions and punishes undesirable decisions with budget cuts, and that the Justices 
respond with decisions more amenable to congressional policy goals.”). 
 158. Id.  
 159. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.  
 160. The fact that the expected outcome is that the legislation would not get passed 
makes it so the mere act of proposing it does not make sense if we presume that Specter is a 
rational actor.  
 161. See Eskridge, supra note 110, at 644; text accompanying note 127.  
 162. Congress regularly passes laws with the expectation or the hope that the Court will 
clean them up or overturn them. These tactics are used either to “pass the buck” to the Court, 
because then Congress can blame the Court when a popular but unconstitutional law is 
overturned; or to speed up the legislation process by getting the Court to pare the legislation 
down to what is allowable. Dahlia Lithwick & Richard Schragger, Pass the Buck, SLATE 
(Oct. 7, 2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2151048/. Additionally, the Supreme Court 
sometimes invites Congress to reverse a Court decision. See generally Lori Hausegger & 
Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in 
Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI., 1, 162 (1999). 
  Even though the Supreme Court’s preference in terms of being overturned may 
matter in its own decision making, its preference does not really matter in the analysis if 
Congress does not care about being overturned. This difference is because if Congress did 
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There remains the following plausible explanation: While Specter may 
legitimately wish to have Supreme Court proceedings televised, he probably knows 
that he is unlikely to accomplish his goal through normal legislation.
163
 Getting 
cameras in the Supreme Court is simply not something worth Congress’s time and 
risk because it does not offer any benefit to Congress. First, however inefficient 
government entities may be, it should be a reasonable assumption that Congress 
would rather not waste time on matters that offer its members no benefit. The 
legislative process is not a short or easy one,
164
 so Congress members would rather 
spend their time on issues affecting their chances of re-election.
165
 While Specter 
and others have offered evidence that the majority of Americans would like to see 
cameras in the Supreme Court,
166
 the numbers do not necessarily signify actual 
public interest. The evidence mentioned is a survey conducted in 2006 that asked, 
“Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to allow television coverage of the 
U.S. (United States) Supreme Court?”167 The result was that 70% of the 900 voters 
surveyed said it was a “good idea.”168 While this survey does say something about 
public opinion on the matter, it does not necessarily support the conclusion that 
voters are concerned about whether there are cameras in the Supreme Court. A 
voter answering affirmatively to a survey question over the phone is quite different 
from the same voter writing his or her state representative to show his or her 
support on the issue.
169
 So while it may be a voter preference, voters probably do 
not cast votes based on the stance a candidate takes regarding cameras in the 
Supreme Court (or even give that factor any meaningful weight). Accordingly, 
basic political strategy would suggest it is not worth the time of any member of 
Congress to put more than minimal effort into such a bill.
170
 Why Specter chose to 
do so was probably based on ulterior motives—possibly his disapproval of some of 
the Court’s past decisions.171 
                                                                                                                 
not care about being overturned, it would just pass the bill and let the rest of the game play 
out however the Court wants it to. In other words, Congress would have a dominant strategy 
because they would have nothing to lose and everything to gain by passing the bill. While an 
outright aversion to being overturned is not true regarding both the Supreme Court and 
Congress, the discrepancy involving the Supreme Court will be ignored in this discussion 
because it does not truly affect the outcome as does the failure of the same assumption 
regarding Congress. 
 163. Even some of those who view the bill as a good idea and capable of withstanding 
constitutional scrutiny still think that imposing such a law on the Court is probably not the 
best strategy. See, e.g., Maness, supra note 53, at 184. 
 164. Cross & Nelson, supra note 139, at 1452. 
 165. Id. 
 166. TONG, supra note 3, at 1. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. This is not to say that there are no voters who are concerned with getting cameras in 
the Supreme Court, but other surveys have indicated what little interest voters actually have. 
For example, a recent PublicMind poll found that only 17% of respondents would watch 
Supreme Court hearings regularly and 33% would sometimes watch them. FARLEIGH 
DICKINSON UNIVERSITY’S PUBLICMIND POLL, Public Says Televising Court Is Good for 
Democracy (Mar. 9, 2010), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/courttv/.  
 170. See Cross & Nelson, supra note 139, at 1452. 
 171. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text; infra notes 179–82 and 
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The second aspect making bills like Senate Bill 446 not worthwhile is the risk 
involved. Even given that Congress might not care about being overturned,
172
 the 
lack of a real benefit from a political standpoint makes this particular issue not 
worth upsetting the Court. While Specter thinks that the Court does not give proper 
deference to Congress,
173
 there are instances where Congress has been able to 
stretch limits because the Supreme Court has allowed it to do so. One prime 
example is the Voting Rights Act.
174
 Over several decades the Court has allowed 
Congress to exert power with little substantive reasoning through the Voting Rights 
Act.
175
 There is considerable debate as to why the Court has chosen to do so,
176
 but 
it may just be an example of the Court picking its battles with Congress. The point 
is that Congress should pick its battles with the Court because both branches 
depend on each other for some level of deference.
177
 Putting cameras in the 
Supreme Court is not worth the risk of losing the Court’s deference elsewhere 
because Congress gains little, or maybe even nothing, by enacting a law like Senate 
Bill 446.
178
  
But why Specter chose to repeatedly propose legislation like Senate Bill 446 
remains unsettled. The arguments in the paragraph above make his actions seem 
irrational, but he appears to have ulterior motives that are directed more at 
punishing the Supreme Court than advancing his own career as a senator.
179
 Not 
surprisingly then, it has been argued that Specter is simply not arguing his case for 
cameras correctly.
180
 Tony Mauro
181
 argues that Specter is making personal attacks 
on the Court through these proposals as a punishment for prior Court decisions that 
may have impeded on Congress’s authority.182 The combination of Mauro’s 
observations and the conclusions drawn above—showing that Senate Bill 446 is 
ultimately not worthwhile for a senator—make it seem that while Specter 
repeatedly proposes the bill, he does not truly expect to get it passed. His lack of 
follow-through lends a better explanation than game theory as to why these bills 
                                                                                                                 
accompanying text.  
 172. See supra note 162. 
 173. See Mauro, supra note 98, at 10.  
 174. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights 
Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 760–61 (2009) (arguing that, with regard to an early 
challenge to the Voting Rights Act, “existing law offered no match for the Court’s 
willingness to offer Congress what amounted to a free pass”). 
 175. See id. at 760–63. 
 176. Id. at 763. 
 177. See, e.g., Peabody, supra note 58, at 20–21. 
 178. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.  
 179. See Mauro, supra note 98, at 11 (interpreting one of Specter’s floor speeches to 
insinuate that forcing cameras into the Court “will make it clear to the public the extent to 
which the Supreme Court is dissing Congress”). 
 180. Id. at 8 (“[I]nstead of making his case with a straightforward appeal to the public’s 
right to know, Specter has introduced arguments in favor of his bill that seem destined to 
antagonize the Court, drive it into the shadows, or both. Chances of passage might improve 
if Specter adjusts his tactics.”). 
 181. “Supreme Court Correspondent, Legal Times, American Lawyer Media, and 
law.com; member of the steering committee of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press.” Mauro, supra note 98, at 8 n.*. 
 182. Id. at 10. 
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have repeatedly been proposed but never given any real consideration by Congress. 
Essentially, since it is not worthwhile for Congress to pass bills like Senate Bill 446 
because of the interbranch turmoil it could cause, Congress is better off just 
keeping the debate alive through congressional discussions and the resulting media 
coverage. Specter makes his opinion public merely to give the idea of cameras in 
the Supreme Court some face time in the media.
183
 His strategy may have merit 
based on fairly recent research tracking public opinion and its effect on the 
Court.
184
 While it is impossible to know for certain, Specter may have been 
proposing the bill merely to draw attention to his cause. His strategy might hold 
merit, since evidence shows that the Court is swayed, at least to a degree, by public 
opinion.
185
 If the research holds true that the Supreme Court does take public 
opinion into consideration in its decision making, the Court may “change its mind” 
on its own and decide to allow televised coverage of proceedings without being 
seen as deferring to Congress and without Congress having to push the Court 
beyond the unwritten boundaries of separation of powers.  
Regardless of the reasons why Specter has repeatedly proposed the bill and why 
Congress as a whole has repeatedly failed to enact it, it seems relatively clear that 
such a mandate on the Court is unlikely in today’s environment.186 Still, it is 
possible to accomplish the ultimate goal eventually.
187
 Multiple Justices have 
acknowledged the possibility of televising oral arguments at some point in their 
career.
188
 So Specter’s plan, or at least what this Note argues was his plan, might 
work because, if he or a future member of Congress keeps the debate in the public 
and the Court’s mind, the Court may eventually act on its own. The Court made a 
similar decision after Bush v. Gore when the Court decided to promptly release the 
audio of the arguments to the public, presumably because of the public pressure 
involved in the high profile case.
189
 Additionally, the environment may change to 
the point where such a law would survive the gauntlet of legislation so easily that 
the Court would have no basis to resist it.
190
 Professor Peabody argues that if 
Congress could act quickly at a time when support for the Court was at a low point, 
then public opinion would be so heavily in Congress’s favor that the Court would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. See, e.g., supra notes 1, 38. 
 184. See generally Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch 
Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. 
POL. 1018, 1018 (2004). 
 185. Id. 
 186. This presumption is made based on the game theory analysis in Part IV of this Note, 
the openness of the Court’s opposition to the legislation, and the fact that none of the 
proposed bills have made it past committee. 
 187. See generally Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 595 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he day may come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in the 
daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in 
courtrooms may disparage the judicial process.”). 
 188. See Sundquist, supra note 142. 
 189. See Collins, supra note 35, at 14.  
 190. See supra Part IV.D. 
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essentially have no choice but to uphold the law, knowing that Congress would 
fight any attempt by the Court to deem it unconstitutional.
191
  
CONCLUSION 
While the constitutionality of a bill like Senate Bill 446 is questionable, the 
Constitution is not what is going to get cameras into, or keep them out of, the 
Supreme Court. First, the Supreme Court gets to decide what is and what is not 
constitutional;
192
 and its Justices have made clear that the likely outcome would be 
a negative one.
193
 Second, a game theory analysis predicts that Congress should not 
pass the bill,
194
 but it does not help explain why the bill gets proposed in the first 
place. Third, and the crux of this analysis, the political game that Congress must 
play puts this particular issue low on its members’ radar because the issue is low on 
the public’s radar.195 Accordingly, members of Congress have no real incentive to 
act on the matter unless they—like Specter—aim more toward seeking revenge on 
a Court that has overstepped its boundaries than actually seeking future votes.
196
 
Therefore, if the public and Congress truly desire cameras in the Court, the best and 
most likely route to accomplish such a goal is to forego legislating on the topic and 
to push the Court to make the decision itself through the use of other measures, 
such as public opinion or political maneuvers. Since Specter is no longer in the 
Senate, his successors in Congress should continue to propose legislation if they 
have a legitimate reason for wanting cameras in the Court, but they should not exert 
any more effort than is needed to get the public’s attention. Additionally, while 
Specter captured public attention, he also made clear his displeasure with the Court. 
In the future, proposals for similar legislation should emphasize the public’s desire 
to have cameras in the Supreme Court, as well as any other beneficial effects the 
cameras might have on society. Emphasizing these aspects, and leaving personal 
vendettas out of the debate, should maximize the chance of cameras making it into 
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. There have been two turbulent times when such legislation may have been 
successful. The first was in the midst of Gore v. Bush, when there was tremendous public 
interest in seeing the proceedings and the Court refused to change its stance on cameras. See 
supra text accompanying note 189. The second was after Kelo v. City of New London, when 
the public opinion of the Supreme Court was at a low—even lower than the public approval 
rate of Congress. Peabody, supra note 7, at 177. President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court-
packing plan, while debated as to its causation of the actual results, lends credence to the 
idea that mere threats and publicity can influence the Court’s decisions. The Court-packing 
plan, while it did not actually become enacted, is generally accepted as the impetus behind 
Justice Roberts changing his voting pattern to establish a 5–4 majority to uphold Roosevelt’s 
New Deal legislation. JESSE H. CHOPER, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., YALE KAMISAR & STEVEN 
H. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES–COMMENTS–QUESTIONS 47 (10th ed. 2006). 
 192. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 61, 66, 71 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra Part IV. 
 195. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. 
 196. Not only did Specter openly discuss how his bill would get back at the Court for its 
lack of respect for Congress, but his career was also nearing its end throughout the time he 
proposed the legislation. See supra notes 2, 179–82 and accompanying text.  
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the Court. Eventually, the Supreme Court may choose to open its own doors if it 
does not look like the Justices are giving in. 
